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" An AIDS advocacy group disrupts a governor's state of the
state address, one of several disturbances orchestrated to
draw attention to the group's legislative agenda.
" Religious groups gather for an annual demonstration
against nuclear testing at the Nevada Test Site. After shar-
ing a liturgy, organizers arrange for volunteers "to do civil
disobedience" by trespassing on government property.
" Pro-life activists engage in a weekly sit-in at a local abortion
clinic, one of a number in the region, in which they will
block access to the clinic. They are accompanied by a
bishop who has served a sentence for a previous act of civil
disobedience.
" Sanctuary workers carry out a weekly run to bring Central
American political refugees to asylum in United States
churches. Before crossing the Mexican-U.S. border, they
ask the Latinos to sign statements that they are seeking
political asylum in the U.S.
I. INTRODUCTION
Routine Civil Disobedience: Moral Objections
Each of these four actions counts as an act of civil disobe-
dience. Each entails the breaking of an ordinance or law (dis-
turbing the peace, trespass, blocking public access, assisting
illegal entry, respectively) in protest of a perceived legal injus-
tice. What also characterizes them is that they are repeated
acts. Each stands as one in a series of acts of disobedience in
protest of civil law and public policy. Each constitutes a step in
a pattern of defiance of public authority, undertaken to prod
officials into changing a morally offensive law or policy. For
some, AIDS activists in the ACT-UP mode, for example, dis-
ruptive and defiant civil disobedience is the preferred mode of
protest in the face of unresponsive political processes.
* Bannan Scholar, Santa Clara University, January 1991.
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Some commentators regard such disobedience as both
obligatory and virtuous.' The contractarian tradition, which
underlies much of American democratic practice, for example,
asserts the fundamental right of individuals to submit only to
authorities they themselves have constituted, and to rebel
against those officials who violate their essential rights.2 On
the contractarian view, argues Michael Walzer, dissent is an
indispensable part of democratic government.3 Just as Jeffer-
son believed that the tree of liberty needed to be watered every
quarter century by the blood of revolution, so liberal contract
theorists hold that dissent is an integral element in democratic
self-government.4 On the whole, contemporary liberal political
theory tends to be skeptical of political obligation and assertive
of the rights of disobedients.
For many others, however, especially those in the mainline
Christian traditions,5 the defiance of disobedients is justified by
the gravity of the injustice of the law they are protesting. Some
would hold, like Thomas Aquinas, that "if a law is at variance in
any particular with the natural law, it is no longer legal, but
rather a corruption of law." 6 The Christian's primary obliga-
tion belongs to God, and bnly secondarily to human law and
political authorities. Accordingly, opposition to an unjust law
is justified after a careful consideration of the good and evil
involved in opposing governmental authorities.7
1. On the citizen's duty to disobey, see M. WALZER, OBLIGATIONS:
ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR, CITIZENSHIP 16-23 (1970) [hereinafter
WALZER].
2. Id. at 9-10, 18, 49-50.
3. Id. at 10-14, 57-58, 68-69.
4. The eminent Catholic theologian of church and state, John Courtney
Murray, seemed to hold a similar view on the articulation of natural law and
the American constitutional consensus. See J. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE
TRUTHS: REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 82 (1960).
5. See generally D. STEVICK, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND THE CHRISTIAN 39-
77 (1969).
6. T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE la, 2ae, 95.2 [hereinafter AQUINAS].
7. In the natural law tradition, as I understand it, opposition to unjust
laws, the overthrow of governments, and even the assassination of tyrants
were permitted, but, to my knowledge, they were never regarded as
obligatory. This lack of stringency was due (1) to the requirement of a
judgment of proportion with respect to the common good before such action
would be fully justified, and (2) to a general respect for human sociality and
political institutions.
The contingent character of such judgments precluded speaking a priori
about obligations to oppose unjust laws. Judgments of a duties to act against
established authority depended on an examination of circumstances.
Doubtless, the theory was also limited by underdevelopment of ideas of
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Some natural-law thinkers would even argue that disobedi-
ence is a necessary resort of dissenting citizens. Legal philoso-
pher Michael Perry, for example, goes much further than most
natural-law theorists, arguing that "[d]isobedience to law,
including resistance to coercive law, is an alternative that
remains for the subjects of law when moral discourse runs
out."8 Many, including Perry, join Ted Honderich in support-
ing even violent acts of protest.9 Finally, among Christian
activists, there are political apocalypts, like Jacques Ellul and
Daniel Berrigan, who see nonviolent "resistance" as the ordi-
nary Christian response to state-supported evil."0
By contrast, many public officials and traditionalist polit-
ical theorists object to such repetitive or routine disobedience
because it can undermine respect for authority and erode the
civil amity on which political life depends. While they regard
disobedience as an extreme recourse, they judge routine diso-
bedience to be problematic because it reveals an unwillingness
to engage in civil discourse and a despair of cooperative polit-
ical solutions. They surmise that the confrontationalism evi-
dent in routine civil disobedience stimulates social and political
antagonism, and they note that "cd" often results in violence.
Like the late Justice Abe Fortas, they perceive civil disobedi-
ence as a threat to law and order." In company with the U.S.
Commission on Civil Disorders, they regard acts of civil disobe-
dience as incentives to violence. 12
B. Roman Catholic Position
In the matter of political obligation, natural law justifica-
tions of civil disobedience notwithstanding, Roman Catholic
practice has tended to the traditionalist side of the argument.
It affirms that membership in civil society and in the polity
antecede the deliberate choices of contracting individuals and
that people "owe" the state obedience and respect. The
grounds of this obligation may vary - the divine origin of
citizenship and individual rights which evolved in the Enlightenment in the
wake of the English, American and French revolutions.
8. M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAw: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 113
(1989).
9. See T. HONDERICH, VIOLENCE FOR EQUALITY: INQUIRIES IN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY (1989).
10. See infra note 60.
11. See A. FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
(1968).
12. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL
DISORDERS 204-05 (1968).
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authority, gratitude for benefits received, the common good,
among others - but the weight of political obligation is clear. '3
The ordinary duty of citizens is to obey the law and to use and
respect legal political processes. Appreciative of the positive
value of human sociality, including political life, Catholicism
finds the erosion of respect for authority and the depreciation
of political community in routine civil disobedience morally
problematic to a degree that the liberal political tradition does
not.' 4 A sometimes controverted censure of liberal contractari-
anism by Pope Paul VI in the Apostolic Letter OCTAGESIMA
ADVENIENS makes the point:
[The Christian may not] adhere to the liberal ideology
which believes it exalts individual freedom by withdraw-
ing it from every limitation, by stimulating it through
exclusive seeking of interest and power, and by consider-
ing social solidarities as more or less automatic conse-
quences of individual initiatives, not as an aim and a
major criterion of the value of the social organization.'
Thus, even Pope Paul, the twentieth century's most liberal
pope, was highly critical of the individualist assumptions of lib-
eral political theory. In particular, he challenged the notion
that social institutions are only the outcome of individual deci-
sions. The premise of this Catholic criticism of liberal individu-
alism, then, is that social institutions, including political ones,
require both respect and active support. Above all, the Catho-
lic perspective on political life requires that all actors consider
the impact of one's demands and actions on the good of all in
the society.' 6
13. See AQUINAS, supra note 6, at la, 2ae, 101-04.
14. For the human sociality in Roman Catholic thought, particularly the
Thomist synthesis, see T. GiLBY, BETWEEN COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY: A
PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY OF THE STATE 165-307 (1953).
An outstanding illustration of this motif in contemporary Roman
Catholic social teaching may be found in Vatican II's Gaudium et Spes, paras.
23-32, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 222-32 (W. Abbott ed. 1966).
15. Octagesima Adveniens in THE GOSPEL OF PEACE AND JUSTICE:
CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING SINCE POPE JOHN 498 (U. Gremillion ed. 1976).
Pope Paul reminded Christian political activists in the West that, like
Marxism, "the liberal political ideology calls for careful discernment,"
because of an "erroneous affirmation of the autonomy of the individual in his
activity, his motivation, and the exercise of his liberty." Id. at 501. The
evenhanded critique of western liberalism as well as Marxism has been
continued by Pope John Paul leading to outraged protests of "moral
equivalence" of the faults of West and East from opponents of Catholic social
teaching. See SOLLICrrUDO REI SOCIALIS (On Social Concern 1987).
16. On the general understanding of political life in Official Catholic
Social Teaching, see Gaudium et Spes, supra note 14, at paras. 73-75.
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While the Catholic tradition has denounced the unre-
strained individualism of the liberal tradition, it has also
affirmed the rights of conscience and urged engagement in
political struggles for justice. Indeed, Catholic social teaching
assigns conscience a primacy which is religious. The Second
Vatican Council made the dignity of the human person the
center of its message to humanity and situated this dignity in
moral conscience. The Council's Pastoral Constitution
declared: "Conscience is the most secret core and sanctuary of
a man [sic]. There he is alone with God, whose voice echoes in
his depths... [C]onscience reveals the law which is fulfilled by
love of God and neighbor."' 7 Following this understanding of
conscience, the Council, in a departure from precedent, explic-
itly requested legal protections for conscientious objectors to
military service. But the rights of conscience, one ought to
note, are firmly rooted in a higher law justification. Acts of
conscience, in Catholic theology, are not lonely deeds of defi-
ance but rather an assertion of moral principles binding on all.
"Conscience," the Constitution reads, "reveals the law which is
fulfilled in love of God and neighbor.""8
1. A Theological Elenchus
Unhappily, the amalgam in Catholic thought of the rights
of conscience with a solidaristic understanding of political life
makes for sterile ambiguity.' 9 On the one hand, church offi-
cials and political protesters can act independently of one
another. The hierarchy does not suffer embarrassment at the
"indiscretion" of faith-inspired activists, and the protesters do
17. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 14, at para. 16. On human dignity, see id.
paras. 210-22.
18. See Pacem in Tems, in GOSPEL OF PEAcE AND JUSTICE, supra note 15, at
paras. 4-7. This encyclical also clearly reveals the cooperative sociology
implicit in Catholic social teaching. See, e.g., id. at 208.
19. Theoretical as well as practical ambiguity about civil disobedience
must be distinguished from the greater clarity and conceptual integration to
be found about the rights of the "person." Personhood is the concept which
has permitted Catholic theologians and ecclesial officials to accept notions of
democracy and human rights at the same time they retained more solidaristic
understanding of the human society and political life. First articulated by the
French "personalist" school of Emmanuel Mounier, the notion that the
person abides in community found expression in the Christian political
philosophy of Jacques Maritain. See J. MARITAIN, PERSON AND THE COMMON
GOOD (J.J. Fitzgerald trans. 1962). For an English-language parallel, see J.
MACMURRAY, THE FORM OF THE PERSONAL (1957). Pope John XXIII defined
the common good of society in terms of the promotion and defense of the
rights of persons. See Pacem in Terris (1963), in GOSPEL OF PEACE AND JUSTICE
supra note 15, at paras. 26-33.
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not have to have to cope with the inconveniences and trials of
accountability to the official church. On the other hand, dis-
obedients are deprived of the richer moral praxis which might
emerge from dialogue with the broader faith community, and
the avoidance of controversy deprives the church itself of moral
growth and taints pastoral authority with the charge of irrele-
vance. The freedom of action such ambivalence allows both
church officials and religious activists is offset by the resulting
neglect of serious moral reflection on varieties of nonviolent
direct action, including civil disobedience. Theologically, the
test is to provide a theory of political life which permits active
dissent of unjust laws and policies consistent with the Catholic
emphasis on human sociality and the goodness of political life.
One possibility would be to construct an argument on the basis
of Catholic teaching on human rights, as it has evolved since
Pacem in Terris, but that is not the route I shall follow, because it
brings us right back to the central issue of the tension between
personal rights and sociality. Instead, I shall argue from an
empirical base, that developments in civil protest make possi-
ble forms of active dissent compatible with Catholic social the-
ology as articulated in recent Catholic social teaching.
C. A Look Ahead
Accordingly, in the pages which follow I would like to
examine the morality of routine civil disobedience in light of
the double tradition found in Roman Catholicism, on the one
hand, the affirmation of political obligation to a pre-existing
society and, on the other, the defense of the rights of con-
science. I will do this by (1) surveying in quick strokes the his-
torical development of theological teaching on political
authority and individual responsibility, and (2) suggesting how
some recent practice of civil disobedience by American Chris-
tians not only meets standard suspicions of civil disobedience,
but also exhibits features which allow for the articulation of a
Catholic theology of civil dissent suited to the main tenets of
official Catholic political theology. I shall propose that ritual
forms of disobedience have created conditions in which protest
can be conducted in the spirit of civic amity, and that civil initia-
tive provides a model for protest which satisfies the expecta-
tions of Catholic political theology for cooperative
participation in politics.
CIVIL AMITY &. CIVIL PROTEST
II THE CHRISTIAN ORIGINS OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND
POLITICAL OBLIGATION2 0
Civil disobedience, as we know it, was unknown through
most of western history. There was rebellion, heresy, revolu-
tion, resistance, dissent. But civil disobedience, understood as
the deliberate breaking of the law for the sake of altering stat-
utes or public policy, is a nineteenth century development. It
may be attributed to Henry David Thoreau whose Civil Disobedi-
ence was published in 1849, shortly after the Mexican War.
Accordingly, tracing Christian attitudes toward civil disobedi-
ence is a matter of tracing a remote ancestry in terms of general
attitudes toward public authority and dissent. As it turns out,
the long history of the limitation of the state power is inter-
twined with the vindications of rights of believers and of the
church as a whole, and only later of individual political dissi-
dents. Locke's contractarian arguments for the liberties of the
propertied class in the seventeenth century were anticipated
and influenced by the repeated struggle of religious believers
for immunity from government repression in earlier times.2'
Indeed, in the United States in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century, the early struggle for political equality was
waged as a defense of minority faiths, like the Baptists,
Quakers, and Catholics, against the established Protestant
churches and repressive democratic majorities in older states
such as Massachusetts and Virginia. But the religious origins of
political liberty ought not be confused with its more recent
expressions like civil disobedience. For the traditional Chris-
tian attitude toward political authority, though it underwent
many changes, is a complex notion which differs radically from
the easy opposition of individual conscience and political
authority associated with the commonsense politics of the
United States today. The difficulty goes back to some of the
earliest strands of Christian thinking on politics in the New
Testament.
A. New Testament and Early Christianity
As philosophical discussions of civil disobedience tend to
begin with the trial and death of Socrates, so Christian theolog-
20. For a brief, analytic, historical treatment of theological views on
civil disobedience, see "Civil Disobedience," in WESTMINSTER DICTIONARY OF
CHRISTIAN ETHICS U. Childress & J. Macquarrie ed. 1986). See also
DICTIONARY OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, J. Dwyer ed.fortcoming).
21. See generally I A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES
112-33 (1950).
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ical discussions begin with trial and death of Jesus. 2 In the
synoptic gospels, when the Roman procurator, Pontius Pilate,
attempts to interrogate him, Jesus simply remains silent. In
John's gospel, however, the evangelist re-works the trial scene,
embellishing it with an exchange between Jesus and Pilate,
which set both the pattern for Christians' later acceptance of
political authority and the standard for non-resistance to evil
which inspired three centuries of martyrs.
In the Johannine account, Jesus appears before the Procu-
rator twice. In the first appearance,23 they spar over the charge
thatJesus is "King of theJews." Finally,Jesus responds, "Mine
is not a kingdom of this world." Then, spurred by Pilate's
irony, Jesus confesses "Yes, I am a king. I was born for this; I
came into the world for this: to bear witness to the truth; and
all who are on the side of truth listen to my voice." In this way,
John's Jesus parries Pilate's cynical irony with paradox.
In the second encounter,24 after Jesus has been scourged
and mocked by Pilate's guards, the Roman asks Jesus, "Are you
refusing to speak to me? Surely you know I have the power to
release you and I have the power to crucify you?" Jesus
answers, "You would have no power over me if it had not been
given from above . .-. " Both encounters establish a complex
relation between political realism and religious actuality. Jesus
rejects any direct political role for himself, accepting only a
prophetic responsibility for the Truth, just as he professes to a
kingship "not of this world." Thus, while there is a denial of
outright political involvement, there is likewise an assertion of
independent religious authority.
The same kind of division of spheres is evident in one of
the most influential New Testament "political texts," namely,
the controversy saying about Caesar's coin: "Give to Caesar
what belongs to Caesar, and to God what belongs to God."25
Thus, there are two parallel sets of duties, one political, the
22. For a full discussion of Socratic politics and the debate which has
surrounded it, see R. KRAuT, SOCRATES AND THE STATE (1984).
23. John 18:28-40.
24. John 19:8-16.
25. Matthew 22:21. See also the related story of the Temple Tax, Matthew
17:24-27. While the authority involved by our definition would be religious
rather than strictly political, the admonition is the same: comply with the
demand. In the case of the Temple Tax, however, the question of an
exemption for Jesus' followers is posed. Nonetheless, Jesus supports
payment of the tax for fear that the tax collectors would be offended.
Accordingly, even where the new order established by Jesus is recognized,
and disciples might plead immunity, they are urged to conform to the usual
practice.
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other religious. In this division of demands, early Christians
found justification for submission to political authority. It is
easy to understand why the Gelasian doctrine of "the two
swords," i.e., distinct spiritual and temporal powers, would
seem so plausible to medieval Christians. Not only were there
unambiguous texts to prove the point, but Jesus' very own
death warranted obedience to the temporal power. If such
obedience were inappropriate, then the manner at least of his
death was inexplicable.
Jesus' second meeting with Pilate offers an even stronger
argument for obedience to authority, namely, the divine source
of all authority. The generative argument for authority, i.e.,
the notion that those charged with maintaining political order
receive their power from the Source of All Order, would
become a recurrent one in Christianity, appearing in Augus-
tine, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, and Barth. The earliest Christian
author, Saint Paul, employed the generative argument to rein
in enthusiasts who believed they were not obliged to pay taxes.
"You must all obey the governing authorities," he writes.
"Since all government comes from God, the civil authorities
were appointed by God, and so anyone who resists authority is
rebelling against God's decision. .". ." In the same text, Paul,
like other thinkers, multiplies reasons for political allegiance,
naming the common good, the maintenance of security, and
the witness of conscience. Such multiplication of arguments
seems to suggest that even for the earliest Christians the gener-
ative argument that authority "comes from God" was not suffi-
cient in itself to convince those who believed that the
resurrected Christ had initiated a new era in history that polit-
ical obedience was demanded of them.
Despite the Christian recognition of political authority,
ruling groups tended to regard Christians' independence in
religious matters as a political risk. In all the gospel accounts,
Jews and Romans alike respond to Jesus as a political actor.
Thus, the imputation that he seeks to be "King of the Jews."
The charge is a political one; and the capital sentence imposed
on Jesus is the penalty for treason. For more than three centu-
ries, the church would endeavor to be recognized as a religio
licita under Roman law. In the absence of such official recogni-
tion, practicing Christianity made one a subversive. Even early
Christian apologetics was as much an effort to win official
approval as a recognized sect as it was an attempt to convince
potential converts of the plausibility of Christian faith. As a
26. Romans 13:1-2.
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result, when the church finally won legal recognition, the
autonomy that she would claim from the state would be a lim-
ited one, related essentially to religious practice rather than to
conscientious action across the board. Ironically, however,
once Christianity became the official religion of the empire, this
liberty was one it would deny to others, or at least to dissident
Christian sects.
Christians devising a response to political injustice had to
contend with an image of Jesus "led like a lamb to the slaugh-
ter." Church and polity held a paradoxical relationship; Christ
and culture in paradox.2 Christians were in the world, but not
of it. They might offer their outward obedience to the state,
but inwardly they belonged to God. The way to martyrdom
was set not only by Roman persecution, but by the practice of
non-resistance in the imitation of Jesus. He had taught his fol-
lowers "to turn the other cheek, ' 28 and the manner of his
death had vindicated his teaching. Accordingly, they too would
accept persecution, torture and death at the hands of the
Roman authorities.
On balance, the earliest Christian attitude toward political
obligation consisted in acquiescence to public authorities.
Among orthodox Christians, at least, there was no outright dis-
obedience, except in matters of religion, when the martyrs
would accept imprisonment, torture and death for the sake of
their faith. For outright dissent, one must look to what would
later be called heretical groups, like the Donatists in North
Africa and the Monophysites in Egypt.29 Among these provin-
cial enthusiasts, religious dissent mixed with political rebellion.
Some fringe groups took heart from the example of the Macca-
bees, the first century B.C. Jewish resisters. Others, like the
Montanists, among them the great North African Tertullian,
drew on apocalyptic imagery of a final cosmic battle to motivate
their adherents, contributing to the long association between
apocalyptic propaganda and political rebellion."0 But for
orthodox Christianity, acquiescence to law was the rule as long
as government required nothing contrary to faith.
27. See generally H.R. NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE (1956).
28. Matthew 5:39.
29. See W. FREND, THE DONATIST CHURCH: A MOVEMENT OF PROTEST IN
ROMAN NORTH AFRICA (1962); W. FREND, THE RISE OF THE MONOPHYSITE
MOVEMENT (1972).
30. On the connection between Christian apocalypticism and political
dissent, see VISION OF THE END: APOCALYPTIC TRADITIONS IN THE MIDDLE
AGES (B. McGinn ed. 1979).
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The first political disobedience on the part of orthodox
Christians seems to have come in the Christian empire when
"soldier saints," like Martin of Tours, refused to fight in battle
out of Christian commitment.3 ' But unlike martyrdom, the
"conscientious objection" of Christian soldiers to killing in
wartime did not set a perduring model for others. On the con-
trary, in the East the theocratic propaganda of Eusebius set the
standard, and in the West, Augustine's coercive state theology
established the norm. For both fathers of the church, the
power of the magistrate came from God, and private soldiers,
save in matters of faith, were required to obey. For Augustine,
even the magistrate's unjust commands did not warrant disobe-
dience. In an opinion scandalous to modem readers, Augus-
tine taught that obedience to authority exculpated the war
crimes of the private solider. 2 Martin of Tours' pacifism did
set the pattern for another group within the western church,
however, namely, the monks. Through the succeeding centu-
ries, monasticism directed the energies of religious dissenters,
committed to a more radical reading of the gospel, into
approved channels."
With the evolution of western monasticism, the pattern of
Christian dissent for the first millennium was set in what I term
the Early Christian Paradigm. That paradigm required obedi-
ence to political authority, except where public officials chal-
lenged the religious autonomy of the church, with more radical
Christians routed into monastic life.
B. Natural Law and the Right of Resistance: Contributions of
Medieval Catholicism and the Reformation
The Christian Middle Ages brought important changes in
attitudes toward dissent. The twelfth and thirteenth century
31. On Martin of Tours and the soldier saints, see L. CUNNINGHAM, THE
CATHOLIC HERITAGE 65-84 (1983).
32. For Augustine's view on military obedience, see WAR AND
CHRISTIAN ETHics 65 (A. Holmes ed. 1975). Holmes reproduces a selection
from the CoNrRA FAUSTuM in which the saint writes, "Since, therefore, a
righteous man, serving [the power of God] may be under an ungodly king,
may do the duty belonging to his position in the state in fighting by the order
of the sovereign . . . it may be an unrighteous command on the part of the
king, while the soldier is innocent, because his position makes obedience a
duty..." Id.
33. On monastic pacifism, see R. MUSTO, THE CATHOLIC PEACE
TRADITION (1989). Cunningham, supra note 31, points out how even the
tradition of Christian soldier (miles Christi) was thoroughly colored by pacifist
attitudes, as evident in Saint Francis, and in Joan of Arc, who refused to bear
arms.
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witnessed an efflorescence of social movements. In quick suc-
cession, all sorts of new institutions appeared: free cities, uni-
versities, corporations, craftsmen's guilds, and orders of
wandering friars. 4 Government. adopted a variety of forms:
monarchy, aristocracy, oligarchy, republicanism, and mixed
regimes. Powersharing was commonplace, and constitutional-
ism made its first appearance. Especially in the Church, there
was turmoil, with conciliarism (the idea that the most authorita-
tive ecclesial body is a universal council) emerging by the fif-
teenth century as an influential doctrine. In this ferment,
numerous lay movements arose, mixing religious and political
goals, and political philosophers, like Marsilius of Padua,
argued for the independence of the state from the Church, an
especially pressing problem in the Italian peninsula. 5 Thus,
the High Middle Ages are rich with ideas and precedents which
would have an indirect bearing on the rise of civil disobedience
in more recent times.3 6
The most significant development of this period for the
emergence of civil disobedience in our own time was the evolu-
tion of natural law as a system of ideas for thinking about moral
obligation. Natural law was a commonplace of classical
thought which the Fathers of the Church adopted from the Sto-
ics. Originally employed in apologetic contexts to show non-
believers that Christians shared many of their views on moral-
ity, it eventually became the bedrock of Christian moral teach-
ing, defining the conduct demanded of all Christians. By
contrast, theologians interpreted gospel injunctions to nonvi-
olence, poverty, celibacy, etc., to be "counsels of perfection"
that applied chiefly to those who aspired to greater holiness.
According to Thomas Aquinas, natural law was a human
sharing in the eternal law by which God governed the cos-
mos.3 7 For Aquinas, law was "a root metaphor" for interpret-
ing reality.38 All human law had to conform to the measure of
reason. Human law, as he saw it, was an extension of natural
law, and so any legal enactment contrary to the natural law
34. See I G. DE LAGARDE, LA NAISSANCE DE L'ESPRIT LAIQUE AU DECLIN DU
MOYEN AGE (1934-46) [hereinafter LAGARDE].
35. See 2 LAGARDE, supra note 34.
36. On the medieval and scholastic contributions to modern political
thought, including the limitations of political authority and the right to
rebellion, see Q. SKINNER, FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT
(1972); 3 G. LAGARDE, supra note 34.
37. See AQUINAS, supra note 6, at la, 2ae, 91.1-3.
38. On the development of the legal metaphor, see H. BERMAN, LAW
AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983).
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would be invalid insofar as it contravened the prior moral
order.s9 The notion that a "higher moral law" justifies disre-
gard for legal enactments was to have an important influence
on later notions of rebellion and dissent. Even in cultures like
our own where "natural law" is not widely accepted, "higher
law" justifications appear time and again as a means of explain-
ing conscientious violation of existing law. In recent years, for
example, both Operation Rescue and Sanctuary workers as well
as the defendants in the Iran-Contra scandal have utilized it in
their defense. The distance which Aquinas's theory of natural
law established between the natural and human law serves, in
any case, as a basis for criticism of and dissent from contested
government policies (as well as assessment of the claims of
dissenters).
With respect to the possibility of disobedience of law, the
Thomist conception of natural law departed in a significant way
from the precedent set by Augustine. Thomas prepared the
way for the modern idea, confirmed at Nuremberg and for
Catholics at Vatican II, that obedience may not excuse people
from personal responsibility and complicity in immoral acts
and policies.40 Augustine held a personalistic understanding of
law and government in which the reasonableness of the law was
subordinate to the power or authority of the lawgiver.4 ' As the
author of the moral law, God created order by imposing his will
on creatures. Thomas, by contrast, held a more impersonal
understanding of law, in which the authority of law rested on its
rationality, a quality all intelligent beings could grasp. In the
area of morality, at least, the appropriate divine attributes were
the convertible attributes of goodness and rationality. God
imposes the moral law because it is good, and it is good
because it is rational, tending toward the flourishing of his
creatures. Accordingly, disobedience becomes conceivable
when government acts contrary to the good of the governed.
The import of Aquinas' view of illegitimate power
becomes clearest in his acceptance of the right of rebellion.
Tyrants may be overthrown, Thomas argues, because they act
39. See AQUINAS, supra note 6, at la, 2ae, 96.4.
40. See AQUINAS, supra note 6, at la, 2ae, 90.4; Gaudium et Spes, supra
note 14, at para. 79. The latter reads: "[A]ctions which deliberately conflict
with these same [universal moral] principles, as well as orders commanding
such actions, are criminal. Blind obedience cannot excuse those who yield to
them .... The courage of those who openly and fearlessly resist men who
issue such commands merits supreme commendation."
41. For Augustine's personalistic understanding of legal authority, see
THE CONFESSIONS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE 87-88 (J.' Ryan trans. 1962).
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for their own private interests or those of their faction, and not
for the common good.42 Popular uprisings, he reasoned, are
permissible to re-establish governments which will serve the
common good. This natural-law doctrine of political authority
constituted a sharp break from earlier Christian thinking, not
only in recognizing a right to rebellion and resistance to unjust
rulers, but also in setting limits to the sacrifices in suffering
injustice that people may be asked to make in the name of pub-
lic order. Over against the peace and order of Augustinian
political theology, Aquinas would weigh justice and reason.43
The need for law and order would not always outweigh the
people's yearning for justice. Under some circumstances,
rebellion could be risked to remedy grave and enduring injus-
tices. Under this theory, moreover, government was not
merely subject to popular will, but to a rational standard ofjus-
tice, creating a scheme of moral accountability for those hold-
ing political power.
For Augustine, the end of government was "peace," the
control of disorder in a sinful world; for Thomas, it was the
"common good" of society. To be sure, the Thomist synthesis
lists peace as one of the constitutive elements of the common
good, since many goods cannot be enjoyed Without social
order. But peace is insufficient in itself to be an end of society,
and when order is imposed at the price ofjustice, people must
consider whether the sacrifice is justified. Making such judg-
ments is the proper work of human reason. Aquinas himself
did not go much farther than justification of rebellion for the
sake of the common good. Later generations of theologians
would elaborate casuistries for judging whether the use of
force, including tyrannicide and just rebellion, was justified.44
Thomas, however, had established the precedent for legitimate
rebellion and constructed the framework in which later argu-
ments would take place.45 In essence, it is the same logic which
42. AQUINAS, supra note 6, at 2a, 2ae, at 42.2.
43. On the balance of peace and justice in Christian thinking, see D.
HOLLENBACH, NUCLEAR ETmICS: THE CHRISTIAN MORAL ARGUMENT 16-24
(1982).
44. See, e.g., F. SUAREZ, A DEFENSE OF THE CATHOLIC AND APOSTOLIC
FAITH, in 2 SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS OF FRANCISCO SUAREZ, S.J. 705-
25 (1944).
45. Id. Following Aquinas, Christian theories of resistance to unjust
authority frequently took the form of discussions of tyrannicide. See, e.g., F.
SUAREZ, ON CHARITY, Disputation 13, Section VIII, reprinted in WAR AND
CHRISTIAN ETHICS, supra note 32, at 223-25.
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twentieth century Christian ethicists have employed to analyze
civil disobedience.46
In the second stage of Christian history, the Medieval Nat-
ural Law Paradigm, firmer foundations were laid for the consci-
entious objection. (1) Support for civil law was conditioned by
its conformity with moral principles. (2) The end of govern-
ment was expanded to include the common good, a balance of
peace with justice and other public goods. (3) Natural law
affirmed the right of citizens en masse to rebel against tyranni-
cal regimes. (4) Legitimate rebellion required citizens' consci-
entious judgment as to the relative weight of suffering an
unjust peace against winning justice by dint of force.
While theologians in later centuries elaborated on the
principles for justified uprisings and sometimes propagandized
in favor of particular political movements, church officials
would hardly ever apply them unambiguously in the cause of
dissident or rebellious citizens.4 7  Particularly, after the
Enlightenment, the natural law theory of political dissent
remained a doctrine for exceptional times, and so failed to take
hold as an operative element in a theory of political authority.48
For its part, the Reformation contributed little to the
refinement of this debate. In fact, the Lutheran reformation
supported unquestioned allegiance to political authority.
49
Calvin, himself a lawyer, did not provide as wide a field for con-
testing authorities as the Scholastic tradition had. He returned
to the ancient criterion of threat to faith as the single grounds
for rebellion. But the tradition of resistance among Calvinists
and the tract Contra Tyrannos provided inspiration for active dis-
sent in England and France, giving rise in the period after the
46. SeeJ. CHILDRESS, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 165-242 (1971); Adams, Civil
Disobedience. Its Occasions and Limits, in POLITICAL AND LEGAL OBLIGATION 293-
331 (R. Pennock &J. Chapman ed. 1960).
47. Typical is Paul VI's much controverted statement about "situations
whose injustice cries to heaven." Populorum Progressio, in THE GOSPEL OF
PEACE AND JUSTICE, supra note 15, at paras. 30-31. The weight of the passage
falls against revolution, but does seem to allow for an exception where
"manifest, longstanding tyranny.., would do great damage to fundamental
personal rights and dangerous harm to the common good . . . " Id.
48. The conclusion that the natural-law theory of political dissent was
practically inoperative is perhaps an overstatement based on post-
Enlightenment church policy. In the reaction to the French Revolution, the
Roman Catholic church tended to take a conservative position in support of
existing regimes and against revolutionary movements. In the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, however, theologians' teaching on tyrannicide was a
cause of political pressure being placed on certain elements of the church.
49. On political theologies in the Reformation, see SKINNER supra note
36; S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION 141-94 (1960).
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Wars of Religion to secularized notions of the rights of the gov-
erned. Likewise, Calvin's proposal that lesser magistrates be
empowered to oust oppressive rulers contributed both to
notions of divided power and to the right of revolution. Thus,
through English Puritanism, the Reformed Tradition, though
theocratic in origin, wound up contributing to belief in the
rights of individuals and to the rise of parliamentary democracy
in England.
C. Democratic Participation and the Rights of Conscience
The emergence of civil disobedience as a component of
democratic practice is a direct contribution of republican poli-
tics and secularized conscience rather than of the major Chris-
tian churches. Some Protestant denominations, particularly
Methodism, whose doctrine of sanctification propelled its
adherents into social reform movements such as abolitionism,
the temperance movement, and women's suffrage, and dissent-
ing sects, like the Quakers, contributed to the evolution of the
politics of protest. As schools of conscience, however, the
Christian churches indirectly prepared people for civil disobe-
dience, but the preparation had to do more with the substan-
tive motivations for dissent rather than with the endorsement
of civil disobedience as a practice. Christian churches contrib-
uted to the anti-slavery movement, the temperance campaigns,
the civil rights struggle and the peace movement for reasons of
morality and religious conviction. The style of their opposi-
tion, however, was shaped by democratic politics rather than by
theological views of political obligation. Thus, the immediate
origins of civil disobedience, in contrast to conscientious objec-
tion, rests with democratic practice rather than with religious
conviction. 50
D. Twentieth Century .Catholicism
For its part, Roman Catholicism, first traumatized by the
fall of the ancient regime and later by the loss of the Papal
States, directly contributed little, if anything, to these develop-
ments. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
when it did not resort to persecution, the hierarchy held Catho-
lic liberals in suspicion. Changes appeared only in World War
50. There is another aspect of American Christianity which appears in
connection with civil disobedience in the U.S., namely, frontier or evangelical
revivalism. The emotional catharsis some find in civil disobedience as a test
of one's moral righteousness appears to have parallels with frontier religion
which merit further investigation.
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II with the Vatican's quiet support of the Allies against Nazism
and its post-war opposition to international Communism. 5
The first full-scale acceptance of democratic politics and human
rights came in 1963 with Pope John XXIII's Pacem in Terris,
which accepted for the first time liberal understandings of
human rights.5" Vatican II's approval of pacifism and defense
of conscientious objection may be cited as the first develop-
ment in modem Catholic social teaching opening the way to
nonviolent action against unjust laws.5" Motivated particularly
by defenses of complicity in war crimes and crimes against
humanity during World War II which appealed to obedience to
authority, the Council explicitly rejected "blind obedience" to
policies transgressing fundamental moral laws.' As a result, in
Catholic as well as Protestant and secular circles, the moral
offenses of World War II led to an increased sense of individual
responsibility to uphold moral principles in the face of unjust
authorities.
Meanwhile, when civil disturbances raised questions about
the legitimacy of civil disobedience as a form of political pro-
test, it was to the natural law tradition and associated notions of
just war that even Protestant theologians first turned in
attempting to explicate ethical schema for assessing the prac-
tice of civil disobedience. In his landmark study, 5 James Chil-
dress, for example, presents natural law, though not
uncritically, as a primary paradigm of a critical form of political
obligation. 6 James Luther Adams, for another, utilized just
51. See A. RHODES, THE POWER OF ROME IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY:
THE VATICAN IN THE AGE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES, 1870-1922 (1983); A.
RHODES, THE VATICAN IN THE AGE OF THE DICTATORS, 1922-1945 (1974).
52. Pacem in Terris, in GOSPEL OF PEACE AND JUSTICE supra note 15, at
201-41.
53. On nonviolence and conscientious objection, see Gaudium et Spes,
supra note 14, at paras. 78-79.
54. Id. at para. 79.
55. J. CHILDRESS, supra note 46.
56. Id. at 50-73. While he claims at certain points to share positivist
sentiments, Childress's own "pluralist" theological justification of political
obligation seems to me to be compatible with the main lines of a natural law
theory of obligation. His distinctive contribution lies in his consideration of
the grounds for obligation in a "relatively just constitutional democracy."
Childress's principal objection to natural law theories appears to be that
they conflate the justice or injustice of certain laws with their validity or
invalidity. What Childress seems to miss in this regard is the' weight of
proportional judgment natural law theories require to establish a duty to
rebel or disobey. Since a duty to disobedience is contingent on prudential
judgments as to the effect of disobedience on the common good, the validity
or invalidity may not be established simply by the disparity of an enactment
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war theory to articulate the conditions and limits of civil
disobedience.5 7
Thus, the twentieth century witnessed renewed appeals to
natural-law frameworks for the justification and normative
assessment of civil disobedience. This Twentieth Century Par-
adigm returned to natural law with two distinctive develop-
ments: (1) a heightened appreciation for individual
responsibility and the rights of conscience, and (2) the adapta-
tion and refinement of traditional just-war principles as they
apply to civil protest.58 At the same time, the Vietnam War and
anti-nuclear protests prompted a recurrence of apocalyptic
thinking on the part of the so-called "Catholic Left" and other
protest groups.59
Ethical and political apocalypticism, whether religious or
secular, is distinguished by an urgent need to resist offensive
government policies and a pervasive suspicion of public
authority as an agent of widespread evil.6' On balance, one
must admit that in the period since the Vietnam War the style
of civil disobedience in the United States has moved more and
more in the direction of the apocalyptic and away from the
of positive law with natural law. The common good, being a formal principle,
seems to function very much in the same way that Childress intends his
pluralist political ethics to function, that is, to make the judgement of the
invalidity or inapplicability of unjust law rest on multiple moral
considerations.
Finally, a very important oversight on Childress's part concerns the
solidaristic nature of Catholic theories of obligation. The conservative quality
of Catholic natural law theory with respect to issues of political obligation
derives, in part at least, from its understanding of the state as a primary
manifestation of human sociality. Until the time of Pope John XXIII, this
naturalistic grounding of political relationships tended to be traditionalist,
emphasizing hierarchical connections between political authorities and
citizens. WhileJohn XXIII and Vatican Council II re-worked official Catholic
social teaching in a more democratic and egalitarian manner, the solidaristic
character of the underlying theory remains. Political obligations are
incumbent on persons simply as social beings in the same way that family ties
are.
57. See Adams, supra note 46, at 301-11.
58. For an application ofjust-war norms to civil protest, see Gaudium et
Spes, supra note 14, at para 79.
59. On the Catholic Left, see F. DU PLESSIX GRAY, DIVINE
DISOBEDIENCE: PROFILES IN CATHOLIC RADICALISM 45-230 (1970). For
contemporary discussion of the radical politics of the Berrigans, see W. VAN
ETrEN CASEY & P. NOBILE, THE BERRIGANS (1971).
60. This radical politics is consistent with a conservative theocentric
political theology. The Calvinist French sociologist and theologian Jacques
Ellul, for example, articulated the doctrine of "resistance" taken up by Daniel
Berrigan and the Catholic Left. See J. ELLUL, THE POLITICAL ILLUSION (K.
Kellner trans. 1967).
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restrained and deliberate form of the natural-law tradition on
political morality. The radical environmentalist group Earth
First and the AIDS advocacy group Act-up are primary exam-
ples of the apocalyptic approach to contemporary politics.
The ascendancy of the apocalyptic style of protest raises a
number of ethical questions. While its, aims and motivation
may be moral, political apocalypticism fails to examine its own
conduct from a moral point of view and its tolerance of emotive
excess may often lead to grave injustices to others - to gov-
ernment officials, to the public, and even to "innocents." But
the dominance of apocalyptic theologies in the anti-war, anti-
nuclear protests of the last three decades probably accounts for
the lack of serious reflection on civil disobedience in Catholic
moral theology. Since apocalyptic Catholic protesters perceive
moral issues in stark black and white terms and are confident of
their own righteousness, they have had no interest in dialogue
with mainline moral theology or the official Catholic. The apo-
calypts, unlike the conservative critics of Catholic social teach-
ing, stood at the margins of Church life, while the morality of
civil disobedience as a long-term political strategy never
focused as an ethical issue.
III. ROUTINE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: SOME DISTINCTIONS
One can distinguish two types of repetitive disobedience.
First, I would differentiate between ritual and routine disobedi-
ence. What I would describe as ritual disobedience consists in
stylized protest in which civil disobedience (usually indirect)
has a customary and regulated part. Ritual disobedience comes
in both secular and religious forms. In the secular form, it may
involve marching, picketing, speeches, and some act, usually
trespass, leading to arrest. In recent years, it has been common
for arrest to be pre-arranged with the police so that officials
know in advance of the act, its timing, and the names of those
who will break the law. In the religious context, the same ele-
ments are present with the addition of some liturgical and dis-
ciplinary features. An event may be staged on a feast-day, like
the Desert Experience at the Nevada Test Site which convenes
for Holy Week each year; the demonstration may be preceded
by or concluded with a liturgy, like memorials for the Salvado-
ran martyrs; onlookers and other people may be invited to join
in prayer or silent vigil with the protesters, as in many events
sponsored on the eve ofJanuary 14, 1991, the UN deadline for
Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait; and so on. The repetition of
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tightly organized events tends to produce gravity, discipline,
and responsibility in the participants.
The solemnity, especially of religious protests, produces
reflection and encourages respect for adversaries and police.
Moreover, since the major actors know the general features,
and even the particular details of ritual disobedience, protes-
ters can register their opposition without arousing alarm in
officials or the general public. It has become customary, for
example, to inform police of what "action" will take place, who
will "do cd," and at what point in the exercises they will take
action. With this information, protest organizers even arrange
arrest procedures with police.
Routine civil disobedience, by contrast, takes performance
of illegal acts as the ordinary way in which dissent from govern-
ment policy is expressed. It is assumed that when there is pro-
test, right-thinking people will "do cd." Accordingly, routine
disobedience can be random and unannounced, leading to
more disruption and tension than would otherwise be the case.
In some cases, practitioners spring "an action" on demonstra-
tors to force decisions for disobedience in the heat of the
moment. Routine civil disobedience also tends to be defiant of
authority and so avoids cooperation with the police. Conse-
quently, routine disobedience at the minimum risks a high
degree of disruption and even violence. Routine civil disobedi-
ence, therefore, invites the traditional criticisms that civil diso-
bedience promotes anarchy and disorder. Violent
environmentalists, like Earth First, are an extreme example of
the ethos of routine disobedience.
-Fortunately, other developments in nonviolent protest
offer the possibility for elaborating strategies of protest which
meet the double Catholic demand for respect for political insti-
tutions and conscientious action on behalf of justice. One is
the emergence of amicable styles of protest among Christian
activists like the Nevada Test Site demonstrators. The other is
the development of an alternative strategy to disobedience in
the Sanctuary Movement, namely, "civil initiative." Each in its
own way manages dissent in a way consistent with Catholic
social teaching on the political exercise of conscience.
A. The Evolution of Protest Toward Civic Amity
The ritualization of civil disobedience - when protesters
act openly, with gravity, discipline, and respect for the authori-
ties - has altered the character of much repetitive disobedi-
ence. That is, as "cd" has become a regular part of political life
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in the United States, it has become progressively less menacing
for the police, for political authorities, and for the public at
large. Indeed, frequent contact between activists and police
leads to amicable relations. Longtime activists at the Nevada
Test Site, for example, even socialize with security officials. 6 '
That phenomenon is repeated in many other confrontations.
Indeed, police and veteran protesters come to rely on one
another to prevent random and even planned violence. When
anti-apartheid demonstrations got out of hand at the University
of California Berkeley a few years ago, police lamented that the
actions had been perpetrated by newcomers who had no inter-
est in communicating with them. In many other events, more-
over, some police sympathize with the demonstrators, and so
opportunity for tension and hostility are reduced. Sometimes
"friendliness" can be a chosen strategy of popular protest. We
have known for some time, for example, that Czech resistance
to Soviet suppression of the 1968 Prague Spring succeeded in
neutralizing Soviet forces for up to six months with tactics of
fraternization. Accordingly, objections to "cd" on grounds
that it debases civic amity seem far less salient in the 1990s than
they were in the 1960s. In fact, as the police-activist friendship
at the Test Site illustrates, regular acts of disobedience may
lead to a friendship, which certainly meets the classic Christian
idea of civic friendliness, though not the ancient Greek ideal of
political friendship. That is to say, warm bonds of -respect
make it possible to entertain political differences and allows for
mutual influence in rational, social and symbolic ways. Given
the immense scale of our political institutions, face-to-face
encounters which generate mutual respect may be a real gain in
the direction of civic friendship.
B. The Place of Civility
Under the influence of Aquinas, Catholic political theology
possesses greater confidence in the positive role of friendship
and friendliness in political life than do other schools of philos-
ophy and theology. While transmitting the ideal of political
friendship associated with the early Greek city-states, Aristotle
eventually despaired of its possibilities for the polis of his day.
Sparta, he thought, possessed the requisite sense of friendship
61. On the Nevada Test Site, see M. AFFLECK, THE HISTORY AND
STRATEGY OF THE CAMPAIGN TO END NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING AT THE
NEVADA TEST SITE, 1977-1990 (1990) (Typescript distributed by Nevada
Desert Experience, P. O. Box 4487, Las Vegas, NV 89127-0487). My
comments on friendships between protesters and security personnel are
based on an interview with Affleck, February 11, 1991.
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oriented to the common good of the community, but it held the
wrong values. Elsewhere civic amity proved to be an impossi-
ble ideal. In the Athens of his day, he complained, each citizen
"lives as he wishes, 'laying down the rules for his children and
wife,' like a Cyclops." '62 For there was less and less agreement
on the common good, and especially on the virtuous life, as the
end of politics. Indeed, Athens was not so different from the
fragmented moral world of modernity so lamented by Alasdair
Maclntyre and other Neo-Aristotelians.63 Accordingly, Aris-
totle chose to praise virtuous friendship as a private good and
an end-in-itself. 4 In Rome, friendship continued to be culti-
vated as a private value.65 The Christians of the late empire,
moreover, adapted this ideal to common pursuit of the spiritual
life, and we have inherited their legacy in the unquestioned
belief that the spiritual life requires leisured retirement from
the world.6 6 Protestant theology, with its emphasis on the gra-
tuitous and self-sacrificial dimensions of Christian love, goes so
far as to reject political friendship "as essentially pagan, an
example of inordinate and idolatrous love."
67
Aquinas, however, drawing on Aristotle but also on the
social experience of his own time, drew a different and more
complex view which has influenced twentieth century Anglo-
American political theology and official Catholic social teach-
ing. European society in the thirteenth century was certainly
not as complicated as our own, but it was far more heteroge-
nous than the ancient Greek polis. Schoolmen, like Thomas,
were conscious of being city-dwellers and they valued the
urbanity which facilitated interaction in a society of strangers. 68
This affability is perhaps better defined as "friendliness" than
friendship as such, but it is a quality which is praiseworthy not
only because it relieves tensions and stimulates mutual esteem,
but also because it promotes the reciprocal respect necessary
for citizens to work beyond their differences in concert for the
62. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 294 (1180a 25) (T. Irwin trans.
1985).
63. See P. WADDELL, FRIENDSHIP 47 (1989).
64. See id. at 46-49.
65. See G. MEILAENDER, FRIENDSHIP: A STUDY IN THEOLOGICAL ETHICS
78-87 (1981).
66. See R. RADER, BREAKING BOUNDARIES: MALE/FEMALE FRIENDSHIP IN
EARLY CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES (1983).
67. G. MEILAENDER, supra note 65, at 75.
68. See generally AQUINAS, supra note 6, at la, 19.1; 56.4; la, 2ae, 94.2;
2a, 2ae, 26.2.8.
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common good. 69 Such friendliness, Aquinas proposed, was a
dimension of justice. 70
Civic amity, understood as friendliness, however, is more
than an amenity. It can also be an expression of Christian love
or charity. "A purely worldly civility," writes Thomas Gilby,
"may be considered apart from grace in the abstract, but
should not be separated in the concrete ... for charity is alien
to nothing human, because it is the form, exemplar and end of
all loves.' On the analogy of faith, all forms of human social-
ity, including politics, are continuous at some level with divine
love. Mere benevolence, even beneficence, according to Aqui-
nas, do not provide a sufficient description of love even in
human relations. The end of benevolence, Thomas reasons, is
a mutual love (mutua amatio) or reciprocal in-dwelling (communi-
catio), which is realized in the communion with God in grace.
All relationships have such communion as their end and par-
ticipate in it in an appropriate degree.7 2 Such communion is
not a possibility in political life because the essential business
of politics is orchestrating the diverse activities of the disparate
groups which compose a society. But, since the concern of
politics is the common life, civility in its deepest sense will
smooth the way to cooperative endeavors. Moreover, while
there are limits to the good of politics, Catholic anthropology
continues to hold that in political society human beings attain a
sui generis development they cannot attain individually, in the
family, or even in smaller social groups.7" Seen from this per-
spective, in the civic arena political friendliness is the proper
expression of Christian love.
After all, it is commonplace of politics that members of
Congress, who have just attacked one another share jokes over
dinner. Such affability is a natural necessity. Ordinarily we
tend to regard such urbanity merely as a social lubricant. Mak-
ing it a virtue requires that it be utilized positively as a way to
facilitate conversation and cooperation, especially in conflict
situations.
69. See T. GILBY, supra note 14, at 189-90.
70. AQUINAS, supra note 6, at 2a, 2ae, 114.2, ad 1.
71. T. GILBY, supra note 14, at 190-91.
72. Id. at 192-93.
73. The fullest expression of the belief in human sociality is found in
Gaudium et Spes, supra note 14, at paras. 23-32, under the heading The
Community of Mankind. More recently, it is expressed in John Paul II's
reflections on human solidarity in SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS, Supra note 15, at
paras. 39-40 (1987).
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Even as a secular virtue, however, "friendliness" probably
ranks rather low in most contemporary tables of the virtues.
From the Renaissance through the nineteenth century, how-
ever, it was a highly esteemed quality. Saint Ignatius Loyola,
for example, listed urbanity among the gifts he looked for in
prospective Jesuits.74 He valued such gifts because they facili-
tated the genuine communication which permitted religious
conversion and moral growth.75 A natural gift, it could become
a Christian virtue in the service of apostolic witness.76 One
may argue in parallel fashion that insofar as civility, whether as
a matter of simple politeness or as a deliberate tactic, fosters
the conditions for communication in serious moral disputes, it
can likewise be a true, Christian virtue. One may regard it as
the positive side of the tolerance which is so essential to demo-
cratic social processes.
Tolerance as such arose as a secular virtue for civic life
after the Wars of Religion. Today it has come to be positively
valued by religious groups. Thinkers propose religious war-
rants by which to integrate tolerance into systems of religious
ethics. John Murray Cuddihy, for example, has proposed that
in a Christian context, at least, tolerance should spring from
humility." In parallel fashion, among Christians, civility
springs from love of neighbor. This was the view held by the
English Dominican, Thomas Gilby, and it seems to have been
shared by the American Jesuit, John Courtney Murray.78 The
place of civility in the midst of protest, however, would seem to
fit more closely with Loyola's notion that conversion emerges
out of personal interchange. Protest and civil disobedience,
which show respect for authorities and affably encourage a
sharing of views, have a better chance of producing moral and
74. See I LOYOLA, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS, paras. 153-
62 (G. Ganss ed. 1970).
75. Christiansen, Experience and Virtue: Christian Moral Development in the
Ignatian Tradition, in To FALL IN LOVE WITH THE WORLD: IGNATIAN
SPIRITUALITY FOR THE 1990s (D. Christiansen ed., forthcoming).
76. Gilby points out time and again that Aquinas, unlike Augustine, was
always able to appreciate the religious potentialities of natural tendencies, so
that simple friendliness could become an aspect of charity. See T. GILBY, supra
note 14, at 191-92. Loyola, once an austere penitent and ascetic, seemed to
have learned from Aquinas this appreciation for natural goodness as a
condition of Christian virtue. See J. O'Malley, Some Distinctive Characteristics of
Jesuit Spirituality in the Sixteenth Century, in J. O'MALLEY, J. PADBERG, & V.
O'KEEFE, JESUrr SPIRITUALITY: A Now AND FUTURE RESOURCE 12-13 (1990).
77. See J. CUDDIHY, No OFFENSE: CIVIL RELIGION AND PROTESTANT
TASTE 203-07 (1978).
78. See J. MURRAY, supra note 4, at 5-24.
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political change than disruptive, confrontational tactics. They
realize the gospel injunction: "Do not be overcome by evil, but
overcome evil with good."79
Thus, when disobedients exercise the virtue of civility, rit-
ual disobedience can intensify civic amity rather than diminish
it. At a minimum, they ease the tensions inherent in protest.
But they can do much more. When, over time, opponents seri-
ously engage one another, they can become political friends in
a significant sense. Their respectful engagement over serious
differences of political morality may further lead to mutual
awareness, moral growth and political change. In a sense, it
promotes what Gandhi saw as Truth [Sat], a political resolution
which entailed both a moral advance and a heightened sense of
mutuality.80
C. Civil Initiative: Bringing Justice and Law Together
A more recent variation on civil disobedience, organized
by the Phoenix Sanctuary, goes by the'title civil initiative."' This
form of civil protest goes to some lengths to work within legal
limits and indeed to press authorities to comply to the fullest
extent with the law. In shepherding refugees across the United
States and Mexican border, for example, Sanctuary workers
request the emigrants to sign statements to the effect that they
are seeking political asylum, in order to refute government
assertions that they are merely economic refugees. This adap-
tation changes the nature of protest by trying to avoid direct
violation of the law, thus blunting the charge that the "initia-
tive" undermines respect for law. It also puts pressure on
authorities for their part to act within the law and forbear from
utilizing extralegal means. In sum, ritual confrontation, includ-
ing civil initiative, embodies modes of protest which positively
address the chief objections customarily made of civil disobedi-
ence. It actually contributes to civic amity and respect for law.
While the American political tradition tends to exhibit
greater respect for legalities than do other political cultures,
respect for authority per se is not as well-rooted in this culture as
in many others. The habit of political dissidence has thrived in
liberal democracy precisely because of the double belief in citi-
zens' autonomy and limited government under law. The result
79. Romans 12:21.
80. See E. ERIKSON, GANDHI'S TRUTH: ON THE ORIGIN OF MILITANT
NONVIOLENCE 412, 433-34 (1970)..
81. I am very grateful to Mr. Paul Crowley, S.J., Santa Clara University,
for alerting me to this new conception of political dissent and resistance.
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too often has been to promote disaffection with all political
authorities and even flight from politics into private life. The
Sanctuary Movement has offered a constructive church-based
alternative to the dissensual politics of protest with the pro-
gram of "civil initiative." It aims at transforming political dis-
sent by challenging the individualist assumptions of most
protest movements, their anti-authoritarian temper, and their
tactics of disruptive acts.
According to Phoenix Sanctuary leader Jim Corbett, the
Sanctuary Covenant is a self-consciously church-centered alter-
native to the tacit individualism of much religiously based civil
disobedience. Corbett writes:
First, sanctuary cannot be reduced to or dismissed as a
matter of individual conscience .... Second, the practice
of sanctuary fuses concerns that are separate and even
competing issues when relegated to the faith practice of
individuals. Asking not "what can I do?" but "what can
we do?" . . . Third, individuals can resist injustice, but
only in community can we do justice.8"
Corbett concludes that the covenanted community "can make
the difference between socially sterile gestures of individual
protest and socially creative community breakthroughs toward
a peacemaking way of life."8" While Corbett is writing out of
his own Quaker tradition, he sees the covenant model lived out
in other communities as well, e.g. in American churches of vari-
ous denominations committed to the sanctuary movement and
in Latin American communidades de base engaged in the defense
of human rights.
Second, civilian initiative directly challenges the anti-
authoritarian posture of much civil disobedience. The Sanctu-
ary movement, according to Corbett, commits itself to uphold-
ing existing just laws in the face of deliberate
maladministration by public officials and even more to uphold-
ing the international human rights accords which are binding
on all governments. "Just as the legal order enforced by the
state presupposes an underlying social order established by the
communities that form the state, the evolution of the rule of
law among nations," he contends, "depends on the prior devel-
opment of an international social order rooted in local commu-
nity practice."" Appealing to the Nuremberg principle of
citizen responsibility, Corbett believes "a society's constituent
82. J. CORBETr, THE SANCTUARY CHURCH 11 (1986).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 14.
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individuals and communities retain the primary responsibility
for protecting human rights." Furthermore, the church, in his
view, "occupies the crucial institutional place from which to
incorporate into community practice international law that
mandates civil initiative to maintain human rights in the face of
government violations. '"85 Of course, in the case of sanctuary,
what was involved was not exclusively "frontier territories of
codified law," but rather the biased and unjust execution of
U.S. law. The movement, therefore, was committed to forcing
the just administration of U.S. law on political asylum with legal
as well as extralegal measures. Protection of persecuted refu-
gees could not degenerate "into a kind of do-gooder vigilan-
tism." "[R]esponsibility for protecting the persecuted must be
balanced," Corbett urges, "by [our] accountability to the legal
order."8 6
While in extreme situations organized resistance to
enforced injustice may be necessary, Corbett regards acts of
resistance as a complement to civil initiative. Moreover, in
addition to explicit profession of nonviolence in the perform-
ance of protest activities, Sanctuary opposes politicization of
covenantal initiatives, rejects sectarianism on the part of activ-
ists, and repudiates the moral and religious apocalypticism
which demonizes government as the Evil Empire. 7 In each of
these discerning moves, church communities, according to
Corbett's view of sanctuary, build barriers against the anti-
nomianism which so often discredits dissident activities. It like-
wise preserves a space for genuinely Christian political action,
where gospel love is able to proceed on its own terms, eschew-
ing both cooptation by authority and compromise by ideology
and moralism.
D. Civil Initiative and Catholic Social Teaching
On many points, civil initiative resembles the kind of polit-
ical activity envisaged by recent Catholic social teaching. The
Second Vatican Council praised "those who renounce the use
of violence in the vindication of their rights ... ."88 In that
brief formula, the Council not only praised nonviolence but
nonviolent struggles for justice. Likewise in encouraging Cath-
85. Id. at 16.
86. Id. at 23. As criteria of accountability, Corbett lists: nonviolence,
truthfulness, catholicity, dialogicality, germaneness, voluntariness, and
community-centeredness. Id. at 23.
87. Id. at 23, 24-29.
88. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 14, para. 78.
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olic political involvement, Pope Paul VI urged a discerning
commitment to the gospel free of ideological antagonism and
committed to the pursuit of cooperative rather than conflictual
solutions. 89 Likewise, John Paul II, in his 1988 encyclical Sollic-
itudo Rei Socialis, encouraged nonviolent solidaristic actions on
behalf of justice, particularly among the poor.90
Even more than the civic amity generated over the history
of religious protest movements, civil initiative suggests that
within the churches at least a form of active civil dissent can be
mounted which not only meets the objections of critics to the
antinomianism latent in civil disobedience, but makes a contri-
bution to the responsible administration ofjustice and the real-
ization of a more just world through nonviolent action. From a
Catholic theological perspective, with its paradoxical commit-
ment, on the one hand, to politics and government as morally
binding expressions of human sociality and, on the other, to
the affirmation of the rights of conscience and the struggle for
justice, civil initiative represents a way to advance the concept
of civil protest in ways consistent with mainline Catholic polit-
ical theology - though not with the apocalyptic views of the
Catholic Left - and its predisposition to favor political cooper-
ation over confrontation. It is worth noting that civil initiative
also coincides with long-term activists' growing dissatisfaction
with civil disobedience carried out on the model of expressive
religious witness.9 '
Thus, we can add to the paradigms set out above a late
twentieth century activist paradigm. In this model, there is
commitment (1) to engage political adversaries and public offi-
cials in the spirit of civic amity, (2) to uphold the just adminis-
tration of laws and international agreements, (3) to work for
the transformation of unjust laws, and (4) to provide help for
the victims of injustice primarily by legal, but in exceptional
circumstances, by nonviolent extralegal means. It should be
noted that this constitutes an extrapolation from the "higher
law views" away from theoretical debate in the direction of a
civic pragmatism which sees human rights and international
law as serving in the place of the "natural law" constructs of
the Middle Ages. In official Roman Catholic theology, this view
is consonant with the Second Vatican Council's view of the
89. See Octagesima Adveniens, in GOSPEL OF PEACE AND JUSTICE, supra note
15, at paras. 2-3, 22-37, 46-51.
90. On nonviolence, see SoLLicrrUDo REI SOCIALIS, supra note 15, at
para. 45.
91. Affleck interview. See note 61.
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defense of human rights as central to its mission as the sacra-
ment of human unity.92
E. A Lexical Ordering
Between civil initiative and civil disobedience which are
both carried on in the spirit of civic amity, I would suggest that
civil initiative is preferable. Given the emphases set by Catholic
social teaching for political participation, civil initiative would
hold priority even over amicable acts of disobedience. It exer-
cises considerable respect for the law, using extralegal means
only as an emergency measure, and demands accountability
from officials for the just execution of the laws. Civil initiative
attempts to act justly both through established legal channels
and through surrogate community actions on behalf of victims
of oppression. Even in extralegal activities, it embraces nonvi-
olence and self-suffering. Finally, civil initiative itself presumes
a constructive political disposition akin to civic amity. In the
event that legal channels are exhausted, however, civic amity
promotes a style in the conduct of civil'disobedience consistent
with Christian charity.
This preference may be formalized this way: in protest of
unjust laws, or of the unjust administration. of just laws,
(1) the principles of Catholic social teaching tend to
favor civil initiative over civil disobedience, but (2)
should civil disobedience be required, it should be car-
ried out in the spirit of civic amity.
Because it presumes civic amity is out of reach and does not
make efforts to create conditions for amicable protest, routine
civil disobedience would not appear to satisfy the conditions of
the Catholic conception of political dissent I have tried to out-
line here.
F. Summary
Catholic social teaching has not had an articulated position
on civil disobedience. Customarily its teaching has pulled in
opposite directions, on the one hand, toward acquiescence to
political authority and cooperation in politics, and, on the
other, toward the rights of conscience and active commitment
to justice. For the most part, American Catholic involvement
92. See Gaudium et Spes, supra note 14, at paras. 41-42; JusTIcE IN THE
WORLD, in GOSPEL OF PEACE AND JUSTICE, supra note 15, at para. 6 ("Action
on behalf ofjustice and participation in the transformation of the world fully
appear to us as a constitutive dimension of the preaching of the Gospel ...
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in political protest has shared in an apocalyptic attitude which
sides with the second of these tendencies to the neglect of the
first. Furthermore, it has shunned moral evaluation of civil dis-
obedience, sharing the common belief that the burden of proof
lies with the government rather than with the protester. Devel-
opments in the experience and practice of civil disobedience in
recent years have laid conditions which make possible a theory
of civil protest in keeping with the traditional emphases of
Catholic social theology on human sociality and the worth of
political life. The growth of friendships between protesters
and security personnel opens up possibilities for consideration
of civic amity as a modern political virtue as well as an instru-
ment of protest. In addition, civil initiative shows a systematic
way for Christians to exercise their conscientious responsibili-
ties in the face of structural injustice. In keeping with medieval
Christian notions of civic friendliness and contemporary Cath-
olic social teaching's profession of the communitarian charac-
ter of the human vocation, civil initiative constitutes a political
form of Christian love. On what might be called the analogy of
love, which stands at the heart of Catholic social thought, civic
amity and civil initiative, each in its own way, contribute to liv-
ing out the law of love in the political community.
